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FOREWORD

In this monograph, Dr. Evan Ellis seeks to do several things. He
documents and examines the character of the new and increasing
Chinese engagement in the Western Hemisphere. He then takes the
analysis a step further by examining some of the potential dynamics
of the Chinese engagement and its consequences for the long-term
security interests of the United States. Dr. Ellis argues that China is
both a signiﬁcant competitor, and a potential partner of the United
States in the region. Although he argues that China increasingly
will vie with the United States for the hemisphere’s resources and
political allegiances, he also notes that China’s growing dependence
on its trade and investment in Latin America will give it security and
stability interests that coincide with those of the United States. At the
same time, the author warns that the combination of competition,
trade, investment, political interests, and concomitant Chinese
population increase in the region is likely to change the economic
structure of the region in ways that could possibly sow the seeds for
the next generation of political instability in Latin America. In any
case, it is clear that Chinese engagement in the Western Hemisphere
will challenge traditional notions of U.S. dominance in the area.
By presenting this provocative analysis, the Strategic Studies
Institute expects to contribute to the formulation of new thinking on
how the United States can address the national security challenges
that it presents, while also leveraging the possibilities that it presents
for the long-term health and well-being of all the countries of the
region.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
In this monograph, the author argues that China’s pursuit of longterm strategic objectives is leading the country to increase its presence
in Latin America, with serious national security implications for the
United States. Sustained Chinese economic growth requires ever
greater quantities of basic commodities such as petroleum products,
coal, iron and steel, and strategic minerals. As the new generation of
Chinese leadership under Hu Jintao has moved away from the more
cautious approach of his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, China has begun
to aggressively court Latin America as its principal source of supply
outside Asia. Figures from the Chinese National Statistics Ofﬁce
show that, for example, 77 percent of all Chinese foreign investment
outside Asia in 2003 went to Latin America.
The pattern of Chinese investment in countries such as Argentina,
Brazil, and Chile suggests that the Asian giant is seeking to assure
access to critical commodities by constructing vertically integrated
supply networks over which it has leverage. China is purchasing
interest in key Latin American suppliers such as the Canadian
minerals ﬁrm Noranda, or the Argentine oil subsidiary PlusPetrol
Norte. It is also building cooperative relationships with supplier
governments such as the joint oil exploration and reﬁnery construction deals signed with Venezuela and Brazil in 2004. Where
necessary, China is also investing in the infrastructure of Latin
American countries to help them more effectively bring their
products to market.
In addition to documenting China’s aggressive new posture in
speciﬁc Latin American countries, this monograph argues that the
expanded Chinese trade and investment presence in the region
ultimately will give China a stake in the politics of the region and may
tempt it to become involved in the region’s security affairs. Expanded
Chinese trade and investment in Latin America, for example, will
expand greatly the community of Chinese nationals in the region. The
broadened community of Chinese nationals multiplies opportunities
for incidents involving those nationals, while also expanding the
community in China with an interest in the region. At the same
time, signiﬁcant Chinese investments in Latin American extractive
v

industries and increasing dependence on its production will cause
the Chinese government to seek to deﬂect political movements in
Latin American countries that could expropriate these investments
or disrupt these resource ﬂows.
Ultimately, this monograph argues that Chinese engagement with
Latin America will make the nation both a powerful competitor and
a potential partner for the United States in the region. On one hand,
China, with major investments in Latin America and dependence
on its material ﬂows, is likely to be a nation interested in reducing
political instability, armed groups, and criminal activity in the region,
rather than fueling radical populism and insurgency. On the other
hand, the United States needs to consider to what degree it is willing
to accept a China that has increasing leverage in Latin America
through its investment and trade presence―and a growing interest
in the political course of the region. Now, rather than later, is the
time for the United States to begin seriously considering how to most
constructively engage the Chinese in the Western Hemisphere.
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U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS
OF CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
The November 2004 Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC)
summit resounded with echoes of trouble for the United States in the
Western Hemisphere. While the U.S. delegation quarreled with its
Chilean hosts over security protocols, Chinese President Hu Jintao
ﬁnalized $100 billion in investment commitments to the region.1 While
the U.S. delegation came to APEC talking about terrorism, deﬁcits,
and the North Korean nuclear program, the Chinese highlighted their
potential as a new source of foreign investment and an enormous
market for the types of commodities that Latin America has to sell.
The events of the APEC summit should serve as a wake-up
call to U.S. policymakers whose resources and attention have been
focused on more distant challenges. Chinese economic growth and
resource needs have led the Asian giant to break with past precedent
and pursue a policy of economic engagement with the Western
Hemisphere that has signiﬁcant national security implications for
the United States. According to one report, “With frequent highlevel visits and billions of U.S. dollars worth of economic and trade
cooperation, [ties between] China and Latin America have entered
the ‘best period in history’.”2
The underlying demographic and economic trends driving China’s
engagement with Latin America are signiﬁcant and enduring―
indicating that China’s increased presence in this hemisphere is likely
to both endure and expand. This monograph explores these trends,
their manifestations, and some of the dynamics through which they
may impact the national security of the United States.
DRIVERS OF CHINESE TRADE AND INVESTMENT
IN LATIN AMERICA
China’s engagement with Latin America is driven, in part, by needs
stemming from the sustained rapid growth and development of the
Chinese economy.3 Reﬂecting a combination of population growth,
industrialization, and modernization, between 1978 and 2002, China’s
gross domestic product grew at an average rate of 9.4 percent.4 In
1

2003, despite predictions that such sustained high rates of growth
were unsustainable, the Chinese economy grew by 9.7 percent.5 The
expansion of the Chinese economy currently accounts for 25 percent
of all global economic growth.6 According to state projections, the
growth of the Chinese economy and its associated demand for raw
materials is expected to continue.7 Moreover, because this growth is
linked to a deliberate government plan to extend industrialization
to the interior of the country,8 China’s demand for both energy and
other material resources is likely to grow at levels equal to or greater
than the rates of growth of its economy.9
As China continues on its path of sustained, dramatic growth,
the country’s resource needs are outstripping its ability to obtain
these resources at home, or within Asia more broadly. In the energy
sector, as an example, Chinese imports of crude oil increased almost
40 percent during 2004.10 By 2025, if current trends continue, the
Energy Information Agency (EIA) forecasts that China will import
9.4 million barrels of oil per day. At the same time, Chinese attempts
to secure sources of oil, including projects in the South China Sea as
well as pipeline deals from Russian and Central Asian ﬁelds, have
been beset by a series of difﬁculties. Growing demand is similarly
exceeding domestic supply with respect to strategic minerals, even
in sectors in which China has traditionally had a substantial domestic
production capability.11 The current compound annual growth rate
in Chinese demand for strategic minerals is 17 percent for copper, 15
percent for zinc, and 20 percent for nickel.12 Reﬂecting these growth
trends, Chinese imports have expanded accordingly. In 2003, Chinese
imports of nickel doubled, while imports of soybean products
increased by 70 percent.13 China also has become the world’s largest
importer of iron ore, with its imports of this commodity increasing
by 33 percent in 2003 alone.14 In 2002, China surpassed the United
States to become the world’s largest consumer of copper. Such
growing resource needs, in combination with problems in meeting
them within Asia, increasingly creates a long-term imperative for
China to look further abroad to secure long-term sources of supply.
In its ongoing search to secure strategic resources to sustain
future growth, Latin America simply has too many commodities
that China needs in quantities too large for the Asian giant to
ignore. Although Latin American oil production is relatively modest
2

compared to that of the Middle East, for example, the 5.5 percent of
global production that it represents is still signiﬁcant enough to merit
China’s attention as part of a larger global strategy.15 Moreover, Latin
America dominates the global market with respect to certain “niche”
commodities of interest to China. Venezuela, for example, currently
has the world’s largest proven reserves of the low-grade petroleum
product ormulsión. Similarly, Chile is the world’s leading producer
of copper, a strategic mineral identiﬁed by the Chinese state as an
item in short supply.16 China currently purchases over $1 billion of
its copper from Chile annually.17
In examining China’s aggressive new posture in Latin America
as a response to the strategic imperatives of sustained growth and
resource needs, it is also important to note the human leadership
context through which these needs, and the alternatives for meeting
them, are interpreted. The expansion of Chinese trade with and
investment in Latin America coincides with the leadership transition
from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao, with the 16th Congress of the
Chinese Communist Party in November 2002 marking a particularly
important milestone in this shift. Hu Jintao and his leadership
team rose to power in a China no longer living in the ideological
shadow of the Soviet Union, with a far larger economy than that
of their predecessors, and with a generation of relative political
stability. As such, the new Chinese leadership has interpreted the
opportunities and risks represented by engagement in Latin America
very differently than did its predecessors. As China scholar Murray
Scot Tanner notes, “Hu Jintao is regarded as less concerned than his
predecessor in avoiding actions that would offend the United States
. . . particularly where it involves China’s ability to engage “thirdworld countries.”18
THE SHAPE OF CHINA’S NEW ENGAGEMENT
IN LATIN AMERICA
While Latin America is not the only region in which China is
developing its long-term resource strategy, it is currently the principal
economic focus of China outside Asia. Moreover, as demonstrated at
the November 2004 APEC summit in Santiago, Chile, China is now
engaged in a course that demonstrates its willingness to signiﬁcantly
raise its visibility in the region.
3

In conjunction with his trip to the APEC summit, Hu Jintao
signed 39 new cooperative agreements in a wide variety of ﬁelds19
and announced $100 billion in new Chinese investment initiatives
in the region,20 including $30 billion for Chile, Argentina, and
Brazil alone.21 The signiﬁcant jump in Chinese investment in Latin
America has two components. First, Chinese foreign investment
globally has expanded tremendously in recent years as a function
of a Chinese effort to “internationalize” key businesses. In 2004,
Chinese companies invested $3.62 billion in nonﬁnancial sectors
abroad, representing a 27 percent increase over the previous year.22
Second, and more importantly, Latin America is by far the central
focus of the new foreign investment strategy. As shown in Figure 1,
almost half of all Chinese direct investment abroad in 2004 went to
Latin America, almost doubling the quantity of investment going to
China’s neighboring states in its own region.23
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In parallel with the growth in Chinese investment, Chinese
bilateral trade with Latin America has also increased dramatically
over the past several years, although beginning from a relatively low
base. Total Chinese bilateral trade with Latin America more than
doubled, from $12.6 billion in 2001 to $26.8 billion in 2003.24 In the
ﬁrst 7 months of 2004, Chinese trade with Latin America expanded
by 54.5 percent25 and is on track to reach $30 billion in 2004.26 A
signiﬁcant part of this increase in bilateral trade was produced by
a major expansion of exports from Latin America to China. Latin
American exports to China, largely in extractive sectors, increased
by 73 percent in 2003 alone, to reach a level of $10.9 billion.27
In this strategy, China is not simply looking to Latin America as
a free-market vendor of ever increasing quantities of the strategic
materials that it requires for economic growth. Rather, the Chinese
are seeking to achieve assured sources of supply in Latin America
through a strategy that focuses on securing the entire supply chain
in critical industries. This strategy of “vertical integration” involves
using strategic purchases and investments to ensure an acceptable
amount of leverage over, and functionality of, all elements of the
supply chain. Depending on the characteristics of the particular
supply chain and the possibilities afforded by the situation, this may
involve purchasing a stake in the key foreign industries to which
it requires Chinese access―and even investing in the transportation
infrastructure of the target country to facilitate bringing the product
to market. Reﬂecting this strategy of “vertical integration” in strategic
minerals, 52.8 percent of Chinese overseas investment in 2004 was
concentrated in the mining sector.28
The remainder of this section analyzes Chinese interests, patterns
of trade, and major initiatives in select countries in the region, and
illustrates the manner in which key Chinese trade and investment
deals are consistent with the pursuit of a strategy of vertical
integration in key resource sectors.
Venezuela.
It can be argued that Venezuela is currently China’s principal
strategic partner in Latin America, both in terms of the volume of
investment, as well as in the nature of the relationship between
5

the two countries.29 China currently has over $1.5 billion invested
in Venezuela―prior to the recently announced $100 million in
investment commitments, the largest investment position of any
country in the region.30 Bilateral trade between China and Venezuela
increased from $150 million in 2003 to $1.2 billion in 2004,31 and is
anticipated to reach $3 billion in 2005, based on agreements signed
during the state visit of Venezuela’s populist president Hugo Chávez
Frias to China during the 2004 Christmas holiday,32 as well as a series
of 19 cooperation accords signed between Venezuela and China in
January 2005.33 These ﬁgures reﬂect growth in both imports and
exports. Venezuelan imports from China grew by 120 percent over
2004 to reach $560 million, while similarly growing oil exports have
allowed Venezuela to maintain a net trade surplus.34
The Chinese relationship with Venezuela reﬂects not only
Chinese interest in Venezuelan resources, but also the receptivity of
President Chávez. His interest in developing alternative markets for
Venezuelan petroleum, and developing a hedge against U.S. inﬂuence
in the region, make him a strong potential Chinese ally.35 In his highproﬁle state visit to China, Chávez signed a number of accords in
which he committed Venezuela to put its petroleum production
“at the disposition of the great Chinese fatherland.”36 On the other
hand, he is also a potential threat to Chinese interests, insofar as his
Bolivarian revolution and support for indigenous populism and antiglobalist causes could foment instability in China’s trading partners
in Latin America, and undermine Chinese access to the resources of
the region.
China’s principal interest in Venezuela, based on trade and
investment patterns, is petroleum products. Exports of Venezuelan
petroleum products to China registered a 75 percent increase in
2003,37 and a 25 percent increase in 2004, reaching a level of $640
million.38 Although the volume of petroleum shipments from
Venezuela to China is limited and there are restrictions on the size
of tankers and cargo ships which can be sent through the Panama
Canal, infrastructure projects are under consideration which could
sidestep these constraints by using pipelines to carry the oil overland
to Paciﬁc ports―either across Colombia or Panama.
As part of a series of accords signed during the state visit
of Chávez to China in December 2004, and leveraging the close
6

working relationship with the Chinese developed over recent years,39
Venezuela will give China access to 15 mature oil ﬁelds, with proven
reserves of up to a billion barrels of oil, for Chinese ﬁrms to develop
and exploit.40 As part of the accord, China will invest $350 million
toward bringing these ﬁelds on line,41 and in exchange will be allowed
to build reﬁneries on Venezuelan territory to process the oil.42 The
agreement will help the Venezuelan government to overcome the
shortfalls in technical management that it created when it ﬁred half
of all workers in its state oil ﬁrm, Petroleos de Venezuela (PdVSA),
following the December 2002-March 2003 national strike. By allowing
the Chinese to directly develop these ﬁelds, Venezuela will be able
to almost double its production despite a lack of internal technical
capacity to do so, selling signiﬁcant quantities of oil to China while
still serving its traditional markets.
As a compliment to its assistance to Venezuela in extracting its
oil, China is also investing $60 million in a number of projects to help
Venezuela extract its natural gas. 43 During a scheduled state visit at
the end of January 2005, Chinese Vice-President Zeng Quinghong and
senior directors of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)
will analyze the viability of even greater Chinese investment in the
development of Venezuelan natural gas reserves.44
A third signiﬁcant element of Chinese engagement with
Venezuela in the petroleum sector involves the Chinese purchase
of Venezuelan ormulsión, and conversion of Chinese facilities to
use it for the generation of electricity. Ormulsión is a low-grade,
high-pollution content fuel oil traditionally given little or no value
because of the lack of a global market for its use. In December 2001,
CNPC and PdVSA established the joint venture Orifuels Sinoven,
S.A (Sinovensa) and invested $330 million to develop a capability to
produce 6.5 million metric tons of ormulsión per year by the end of
2004. In conjunction with this effort, in November 2003 CNPC began
constructing a special new type of power plant capable of burning
ormulsión in the Guangdong province of China.45 Through a deal
ﬁnalized in 2004, China’s commercial agent, Petrochina, a subsidiary
of CNPC, is currently purchasing 1.5 millions of tons of orimulsión
annually from Venezuela.46 By building the new power plant, China
is able to make use of the Venezuelan ormulsión, which it is able to
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purchase at relatively low cost because of the lack of a global market.
Moreover, Venezuela is China’s natural partner for the ormulsión
deal, in that the Latin American country currently possesses the
world’s largest proven ormulsión reserves―almost double those of
Saudi Arabia, the next largest source.
China is also helping Venezuela to extract its coal. At the end
of 2004, China announced that it will invest in the development of
mines in the Orinoco River Basin area in the south of the country.47
China Minmetal and the Venezuelan ﬁrm, Corpozulia, are slated to
sign an agreement during the scheduled state visit of Chinese Vice
President Zeng Quinghong at the end of January 2005 that would use
Chinese investment to increase Venezuelan carbon production.48
Beyond the domain of extractive industries, the ChineseVenezuelan partnership has extended to the agricultural sector, where
Venezuelan interests in improving agricultural productivity coincide
with Chinese interests in developing reliable, friendly suppliers of
foodstuffs. As part of the accords reached between the two nations
during the Christmas 2004 visit of Chávez to China, the Asian giant
has agreed to provide Venezuela with agricultural machinery and
credits for the nation to increase its food production.49
In keeping with the vertically integrated strategy that China has
pursued in other Latin American countries to secure access to sources
of supply for strategic materials, China announced in December 2005
that it will invest in the construction of a national railway line, helping
Venezuela to transport raw materials and foodstuffs to market.50
Finally, China is also helping Venezuela to develop its
telecommunications industry, including assistance to Venezuela
in access to space. As part of the series of accords reached during
the Christmas 2004 visit of Hugo Chávez to China, the two nations
announced that China will launch a telecommunications satellite
for Venezuela, helping the nation become less dependent on U.S.
telecommunications networks.51 The initiative built on broader
discussions of how China could help Venezuela to develop and
modernize its telecommunications infrastructure more broadly,
including a December 2004 visit to Venezuela by Vice minister of
the Chinese information ministry Lou Kinjian to discuss possible
collaboration on telecommunication projects with the Venezuelan
telecommunications ﬁrm, CVG Telecom.52
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Chile.
Chile is strategically signiﬁcant to China, not only as a supplier
of copper and other minerals, but also in respect to its foodstuffs,
and in terms of its commercially developed Paciﬁc ports, which
provide potential Chinese access to a number of Latin American
markets. Bilateral trade between Chile and China in 2004 expanded
more than 50 percent, to a level of $5.365 billion.53 Chilean exports to
China reached $3 billion and could increase by $500 million during
the coming year.54
Key Chinese initiatives in Chile involve its copper and strategic
materials industries, reﬂecting Chinese efforts to secure access to these
minerals through purchasing an interest in key Chilean suppliers.55
Of these, China is particularly interested in Chilean copper, insofar
as it is currently considered a “short supply” item by the Chinese
government.56 Recent Chinese deals in the Chilean minerals sector
reﬂect this attempt to acquire leverage at key points in the supply
chain, including Chinese acquisition of a Canadian minerals ﬁrm,
Noranda, and investment in the Chilean state copper ﬁrm, Coldeco. On
September 24, 2004, the Chinese state ﬁrm, Minmetals, announced its
entry into exclusive negotiations to purchase Noranda, a transaction
of approximately $5 billion.57 Noranda is not only a major producer
of Copper in Chile, but is also one of the world’s largest producers
of nickel and zinc.58 In addition to the Noranda deal, Minmetals
also recently signed an agreement with Coldeco valued at $1.93
billion, assuring Chinese access to Chilean copper over the next 20
years.59 The deal is the most recent in a series of initiatives involving
Coldeco, including signiﬁcant Chinese participation in an October
2004 bond issue. Overall, Asian interests purchased 30 percent of a
new bond issue released by Coldeco―representing the ﬁrst time that
Asian interests had participated in such a bond issue, and supplying
it with $150 million in capital.60
In addition to its role as a supplier of copper and other strategic
materials, Chile is also emerging as a potentially signiﬁcant exporter
of foodstuffs to China. Chilean agricultural exports to China increased
45 percent from January to September 2004 alone, with exports of
$273 million in that period.61
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Brazil.
Brazil plays an important role in China’s relationship with Latin
America. The nation is both a large, mature market for Chinese
manufactured products, as well as a major supplier of soybeans, soy
oil, iron ore, steel, and wood.62 In terms of speciﬁc countries, Chinese
trade with Brazil increased from $1.84 billion in 1999 to $7.98 billion
in 2003.63 In the ﬁrst 11 months of 2004, China-Brazil bilateral trade
expanded by 56.2 percent in relation to the same period in 2003, to
reach a level of $11.3 billion, making Brazil China’s leading trade
partner in Latin America by dollar value.64 In a November 2004
interview, Chinese spokesman Yang Yang observed that cooperation
between China and Brazil was advancing even more rapidly than
that with Argentina because Brazil had clearly outlined speciﬁc areas
of possible cooperation to the Chinese.65
Brazilian diplomatic engagement with China has paralleled this
increasing trade. In May 2004, Brazilian president Lula De Silva
visited China, accompanied by business leaders.66 President Hu
Jintao reciprocated with a high-proﬁle visit to Brazil in conjunction
with the November 2004 APEC summit.
For Brazil, iron ore and associated products have been key items
in its trade with China. Brazilian exports of iron registered the most
signiﬁcant expansion, increasing by 500 percent over the past year.67
During a state visit by President Hu Jintao to Brazil in November
2004, the two nations announced that China will invest $10 billion in
Brazil over the next 3 years, and that within this period, the nations
expect bilateral trade to double to $20 billion per year.68
In addition to iron, China is also very interested in Brazilian
petroleum products. Key recent Chinese initiatives in this sector
include Sinopec plans to construct a Trans-Brazilian gas pipeline
and a Sinopec–Petrobras accord for joint oil exploration and
reﬁnery construction. In May 2004, Sinopec signed an accord with
the Brazilian petroleum giant, Petrobras, to cooperate in the areas
of exploration and reﬁneries, and Petrobras anticipates doubling its
exports of petroleum to China over the next year. The accord also
encompassed the creation of infrastructure that would support these
oil ﬂows, including the construction of petroleum storage facilities in
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the Chinese port of Ningbo to receive Brazilian oil.69 The agreement
came on top of a series of other recent deals strengthening the
Brazilian-Chinese relationship in the petroleum sector, including
Brazil’s selection of Sinopec, the second largest Chinese petroleum
ﬁrm, to construct a gas pipeline that will span Brazil from north
to south,70 as well as the opening of a branch ofﬁce in Beijing by
Petrobras.71
In addition to iron and petroleum products, China is also interested
in Brazilian foodstuffs, such as soy, beef, and chicken, reﬂecting the
need by the Asian giant to supplement its small agricultural belt to
feed its population.
In support of its interest in helping Brazil export products
of interest, China has also made commitments to invest in the
modernization of Brazilian transport infrastructure, including a
potential investment of $4.82 billion to expand and modernize the
Brazilian railway system.72
Although not directly tied to Chinese resource needs, China and
Brazil have also pursued signiﬁcant cooperation in the aerospace
arena. The two nations have jointly developed and launched two
earth research satellites, with two more planned by 2008.73 The ﬁrst
satellite, the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CIBERS-1) was
launched in October 1999, while the second was launched in late 2004.
While CIBERS-1 was an environmental monitoring satellite that did
not have signiﬁcant military utility, it reportedly did assist China
in developing real-time digital photo technology―thus increasing
the capabilities of Chinese military imagery intelligence satellites.
Moreover, by giving the Chinese access to Brazilian satellite tracking
facilities, this space cooperation has arguably helped China to gain
a more comprehensive picture of the ﬂight paths of U.S. satellites.74
In addition to space cooperation, China also has established ties
with Brazil’s leading aircraft manufacturer, Embraer. Pursuant to
an agreement signed in December 2002 with signiﬁcant technology
transfer implications, Embraer established a production facility in
the Chinese city of Harbin, and is currently producing mid-sized ERJ
145 regional jets in the facility.75
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Argentina.
As elsewhere in Latin America, Chinese trade with Argentina has
increased signiﬁcantly over the past several years. In 2003, bilateral
Argentina-China trade reached $3.176 billion―an increase of 122
percent over the previous year.76 Exports by Argentina to China
alone increased by 143.4 percent to $2.56 billion, and are planned
to increase to $7 billion over the next 5 years according to accords
signed between the two nations during Hu Jintao’s visit to Argentina
in November 2004.77
As in Brazil, Argentine diplomatic engagement with China has
paralleled the expansion of trade between the two nations and the
growth in Chinese investment. In June 2004, Argentine President
Nestor Kirchner visited China, accompanied by business leaders.78
As with Brazil, President Hu Jintao visited Argentina in conjunction
with the November 2004 APEC summit, signing letters of intent for
investments in Argentina that could be worth up to $20 billion.79
With this investment, President Kirchner is believed to be seeking a
path to cover Argentina’s short-term debt payment obligations, and
over the long term, to free Argentina from the policy oversight of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).80
To a greater extent than elsewhere in Latin America, a number
of factors have coincided to limit the growth of the China-Argentina
economic relationship. These include the difﬁculty in moving goods
from Argentina to Asian markets―either over the Andes, through
the Panama Canal, or eastward via Atlantic routes. Limitations also
include a strong local business lobby in Argentina, which has pressed
the Argentine government for protection against Chinese products.
Reﬂecting such pressures, in December 2004, for example, President
Kirchner signed two decrees restricting imports of Chinese textile
products to a level tied to previous year sales.81
Current Chinese interest in speciﬁc Argentine industries revolves
around the nation’s limited deposits of iron and petroleum―but also
includes cooperation in nuclear energy and interest in the potential
role of Argentina as a mature market for Chinese products.
The Argentine oil industry was one of the focuses of the package
of investment commitments made by the Chinese at the November
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2004 APEC summit. Indeed, of the $20 billion in potential Chinese
investments in Argentina over the next 10 years, $5 billion of these
involved the exploration and production of petroleum products.82
Complementing and predating these commitments, the Chinese
petroleum ﬁrm, Sonangol, is currently engaged in a joint venture
with the new Argentine state energy ﬁrm, Energía Argentina SA
(Enarsa), in which it has committed $4.82 billion to explore potential
oil ﬁelds off the coast of Argentina, and to investigate secondary
extraction of oil from mature oil wells.83
With respect to Argentina’s modest iron ore industry, the Chinese
ﬁrm, Ling Cheng, was awarded a contract in mid-2004 to reactivate
a mineral ﬁeld in Patagonia. The award is strategically signiﬁcant
insofar as the ﬁeld represents the only proven iron deposits in
Argentina.84
As in Brazil, China’s approach to investment in Argentina has
emphasized development of the nation’s transport infrastructure, as
a compliment to investments in extractive industries. In Argentina,
reﬂecting both the Chinese interest in extracting Argentine iron
ore and the difﬁculties of transporting materials over the Andes
mountains via the existing infrastructure, Chinese interest has
focused on the development of the Argentine railway system.85
Perhaps one of the most signiﬁcant potential developments in the
China-Argentina relationship comes in the area of nuclear power.
China is currently exploring possible collaboration with Argentina on
the development of a new fourth-generation nuclear reactor. Initial
design work on the mid-size reactor has been done by the Argentine
National Atomic Energy Commission (CONEA), in partnership with
the ﬁrm, INVAP, as part of the Argentine Center for Nuclear Reactors
project (CAREM). CAREM is currently exploring Chinese funding
and collaboration on the construction of a 27 kilowatt prototype
reactor, as the ﬁrst step in the construction of a 300 megawatt design
that could meet the power needs of small and mid-sized economies
such as those found in Latin America.86
In the area of space cooperation, China helped Argentina to
develop and ﬁeld its ﬁrst surveillance satellite, SAC-C.87 Although
Chinese support to Argentina in this area does not appear to be at
the same level as its space cooperation with Brazil, the relationship
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remains strategically signiﬁcant because of its technology transfer
implications, and because of potential future Chinese access to
Argentine space facilities.
Colombia.
Chinese engagement with Colombia has been limited, reﬂecting
among other factors, the strong security and aid ties between
Colombia and the United States. Indeed, it was signiﬁcant that while
President Hu Jintao visited Chile, Brazil, Argentina, and Cuba in
conjunction with the APEC summit, the only stop of U.S. President
George W. Bush in the region was a visit to his colleague, Alvaro
Uribe, in Colombia.
Although Chinese trade with Colombia is small, it is both
expanding and touches upon strategically important industries. In
terms of volume, Colombia-China bilateral trade grew by 60 percent
over 2003.88
One of the most strategically signiﬁcant emerging relationships
between Colombia and China involves petroleum products.
Although China does not currently have a publicly acknowledged
role in the deal, Colombia and Venezuela are currently engaged in
engineering-level talks concerning the construction of a series of oil
and gas pipelines that ultimately would allow Colombia to export
signiﬁcant quantities of these products to China via its Paciﬁc ports.
With respect to oil, the Colombian oil ﬁrm, Ecopetrol, and the
Venezuelan national oil company, PDVSA, began studies in 2002
on the construction of a 1,100-1,300 km-long petroleum pipeline to
carry Venezuelan oil from the Maracaibo region across Columbia
to the Choco region of Colombia, and potentially to the Paciﬁc port
of Tribugal.89 The pipeline would thus facilitate the export of oil to
the Western United States and Asian markets, including China.90
Commitment to the pipeline was a key element of recent summits
between Chávez and Uribe, including meetings on July 14 and
September 9, 2004,91 although recent statements by both governments
have raised some doubts about the future of the deal. In conjunction
with the pipeline, Colombia has discussed the construction of a future
oil port on its Paciﬁc Coast with the explicit purpose of reﬁning and
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exporting petroleum products to China and other Asian markets.92
Such a pipeline would not only provide an outlet for Colombian oil
sales to China, but would also signiﬁcantly increase the viability
of Venezuelan oil sales to China, given the inability of modern
supertankers loading on Venezuela’s Atlantic coast to pass through
the Panama Canal.
As a compliment to an oil pipeline, Venezuela and Colombia are
also planning construction of a 177 km-long natural gas pipeline
from the Guarija region of Colombia to the Lake Maracaibo area
(Venezuela’s main oil producing region). Plans for the pipeline were
included in a deal signed in the July 2004 summit between Venezuelan
President Chávez and Colombian President Alvaro Uribe. When
completed, the pipeline will have a capacity to transport 150-200
million cubic feet of gas per day,93 and may eventually extend across
Colombia to the Paciﬁc Ocean at Puerto Ballena. As envisioned,
the gas pipeline would initially export Colombian natural gas to
Venezuela, but the ﬂow would eventually be reversed as Colombian
natural gas production declines and new Venezuelan natural gas
resources are developed and come on line.
Peru/Ecuador.
In both Peru and Ecuador, as in other parts of Latin America,
trade with China is increasing. In Ecuador, bilateral commerce with
China doubled over the past 2 years, from $128.3 million in 2001
to $267.7 million in 2003.94 With respect to Peru, exports to China
increased by 190 percent, while imports from China during the
same period increased by 200 percent.95 Following the November
2004 APEC summit, for example, Chinese Vice-President Zeng
Quinghong met with Peruvian Foreign Minister Rodriguez Cuadros
to sign a number of accords committing the two nations to closer
economic ties, a move which Peru hopes will increase its volume of
trade with China. Zeng Quinghong subsequently traveled to Peru in
January 2005, where he signed a series of eight cooperation accords,
including a “partnership of all-around cooperation.”96
Both Peru and Ecuador are of strategic importance to China, not
only for the strategic resources that each country offers, but also

15

because each possess Paciﬁc ports which may play a role in shipping
goods to China from other points of origin in Latin America. It is
the role of these countries as potential transshipment points that
makes the powerful indigenous movements in each country a
particularly important strategic consideration. On the one hand,
these indigenous movements could help bring pressure to bear in
support of Chinese interests; China has a traditional link to such
indigenous movements, and has long broadcast radio programming
in Quecha. On the other hand, such movements could also play a
role in destabilizing their respective countries or promulgating antiglobalist, isolationist ideologies which would deny China access to
the region’s resources.
Resources of particular interest to China in Peru and Ecuador
itself include petroleum products, cement and iron. Chinese interest
in the petroleum sector involves development of oil ﬁelds by Chinese
ﬁrms, and an interest in the expansion of the pipeline infrastructure in
those countries that would ultimately carry that oil from developed
ﬁelds to Paciﬁc ports.
In December 2003, the Argentine ﬁrm, Pluspetrol, sold 45 percent
of its stake in Pluspetrol Norte to China National Oil and Gas
Exploration and Development Corporation (CNODC), an afﬁliate of
CNPC. Pluspetrol Norte, which operates ﬁelds along Peru’s northern
border with Ecuador, is the principal petroleum producer in Peru.
The acquisition adds to the oil ﬁelds operated by CNPC subsidiary,
Sapet, on the northern Paciﬁc coast of Peru,97 and positions CNPC
to participate in signiﬁcant planned Pluspetrol oil ventures in
Ecuador, Venezuela, and Colombia.98 Similarly, in November 2003,
the Ecuadorian government released new solicitations for bids on
four major oil ﬁelds: Auca, Shushuﬁndi, Culebra-Yulebra, and Lago
Agrio. Award of the contract to one of the two Chinese companies
would signiﬁcantly contribute to China’s access to oil, given
Ecuador’s production of 500,000 barrels of oil per day tied to that
nation’s Paciﬁc ports.99
Despite the current concentration of Chinese interest in the
petroleum sector, however, the Chinese are also pursuing expanded
ties in other domains, including cement and iron. Peru recently
acknowledged China’s status as a “market economy,” impairing the
ability of the nation to bring dumping charges against China in the
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World Trade Organization, in exchange for China’s agreement to
approve Peru as a tourist destination for Chinese citizens―a move
that Peru hopes will promote its tourism and other local industries
in the coming years.100
Bolivia.
Bolivia is of strategic signiﬁcance to China as a potential exporter
of natural gas and strategic minerals, although these exports will
depend on continuing Bolivian access to Peruvian or Chilean Paciﬁc
ports. Over the long term, the ability of Bolivia to export natural
gas to China will depend on that nation’s resolution of its 1996
hydrocarbons law, which is currently under revision in the Bolivian
legislature, and which will ultimately condition the extent to which
foreign ﬁrms participate in the development of this resource.
China’s current trade and investment presence in Bolivia is
modest. The most signiﬁcant current initiative involves Chinese
assistance to Bolivia in constructing a urea plant. In September 2004,
the Chinese Lutianhua Group and the China Chengda Chemical
Engineering Corporation announced a collaborative venture with
the Bolivian LisaTum Par Group to build the plant in Bolivia. Under
the agreement, 90 percent of the project will be developed by the two
Chinese ﬁrms. The plant is foreseen to have an annual production
capacity of 180,000 tons of synthetic ammonia and 300,000 tons of
urea.101
Panama.
The primary strategic importance of Panama to China stems from
the role of the Panama Canal and the complimentary infrastructure
which facilitates the transfer of goods from the Atlantic to the Paciﬁc
Ocean. As a compliment to moving goods overland to Paciﬁc ports,
the canal plays a critical role in making economically viable the
shipment of goods from Latin American economic ports.
The most signiﬁcant current initiative in Panama does not
involve the canal itself, but a 20-mile long, multipurpose pipeline
that was constructed 23 years ago,102 and follows a route parallel to
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the Canal. A project currently being contemplated with the support
of Venezuela would increase the capacity of the pipeline to transfer
oil from the Atlantic to the Paciﬁc sides of the country from 100,000
barrels of oil per day to 800,000 barrels per day.103 Such an expansion
would facilitate and lower the cost of shipping oil from Venezuela
to China by allowing the product to be loaded in Atlantic ports and
transferred to the Paciﬁc. As such, it would provide an alternative
or compliment to the construction of a pipeline across Colombia to
carry Venezuelan oil from the Maracaibo region to Paciﬁc ports.
No discussion of Chinese involvement in Panama would be
complete without a discussion of its strategically important property
holdings at Cristobal, Balboa, and Rodman Point. The Chinese
shipping company, Hutchison-Whampoa, afﬁliated with the
People’s Liberation Army, has 50-year leases on facilities at Cristobal
and Balboa, and has recently been given an option on developing
the former U.S. naval base at Rodman Point. The combination of
the three holdings gives China visibility and some limited potential
control over maritime trafﬁc at both ends of the Panama Canal.104
Although the canal cannot be used for the transit of large aircraft
carriers, supertankers, or vessels over 100,000 tons, some 670,000
barrels of oil go through the canal each day, making it a critical
maritime chokepoint in the Western hemisphere.105
Cuba.
Whether or not Chinese interest in Cuba is driven by the
shared ideological roots of the two political systems, Chinese trade
and investment in Cuba is growing signiﬁcantly. Over the past
year, bilateral Chinese-Cuban trade expanded 36 percent to $401
million.106
Following the November 2004 APEC conference and associated
state visits to Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, President Hu Jintao also
visited Cuba, where he signed 16 bilateral commercial accords,
committing to more than $500 million in Chinese investment in
Cuba.107 As part of the state visit, the two countries also conducted
the ﬁrst annual “Forum of Chinese-Cuban Investment,” with 400
businessmen from both nations in attendance.108
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Mexico.
Chinese trade with Mexico is signiﬁcant and has been expanding
at the same rapid rate as with other parts of Latin America. Between
1998 and 2003, Mexican exports to China increased by 337 percent,
while corresponding imports from China increased by 476 percent.109
In 2004, bilateral trade between China and Mexico was more than $7
billion, representing a 44 percent increase over 2003.110 By contrast
to other Latin American countries, however, Mexico has a trade
deﬁcit with China that is signiﬁcant and growing. Mexican imports
from China in 2003 were $9,298 million, compared to exports of $463
million.111 Indeed, if the Mexican trade deﬁcit with China was only
half of this level, Latin America as a whole would register a positive
balance of trade with the Asian giant.
A study by BBVA suggests that, by contrast to other nations in
Latin America, the structure of Mexican exports resemble that of
China.112 Thus while the economies of many other nations in Latin
America may be regarded as complimenting those of China, Mexico
is more of a direct competitor―particularly in labor-intensive, lowvalue added manufacturing sectors. Perhaps reﬂecting the less
complimentary nature of the economic relationship between the two
countries, Chinese investment in Mexico has been relatively modest
relative to other Latin American countries―$200 million in 2004, for
example.
Despite the current nature of the relationship in the short term,
Mexico offers a number of attractions for China, including signiﬁcant
quantities of oil and other strategic materials, and a number of
commercially developed Paciﬁc ports. On the other hand, Mexico
currently uses almost all of the oil that it produces, leaving little
available for export. Moreover, Mexico’s proximity to the United
States may make China wary of too aggressively pursuing investment
there in the near term. Nonetheless, China has indicated interest in
pursuing a relationship with Mexico in a number of important arenas,
as reﬂected by inclusion of Mexico as the ﬁrst stop in a high-proﬁle
ﬁve-nation Latin American and Caribbean tour made by Chinese
Vice-President Zeng Quinghong in January-February 2005.113
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Other Strategically Signiﬁcant Trade and Investment Initiatives.
The concentration of Chinese trade and investment growth
in the region has been in South America, despite signiﬁcant
petroleum and mineral resources in Latin American countries such
as Mexico. Nonetheless, the Chinese presence in Central America
and the Caribbean has been increasing as well. The expansion of
trade and investment ties was the central theme, for example, of
the China-Caribbean Economy and Trade Cooperation Forum,
held on February 2, 2005 in Kingston, Jamaica.114 As part of the
same trip, Chinese Vice-President Zeng Qinghong signed a series
of agreements with Mexican President Vincente Fox, including the
establishment of a team to promote trade and investment between
the two countries.115 A recent report by the Spanish investment ﬁrm,
La Caixa, cited excessive dependence on Chinese investment as one
of the principal risks governing the economic growth of the region.116
Even in Guatemala, which historically has not had signiﬁcant trade
relationships with Asia, some 13 percent of the nation’s sugar exports
in 2004 will go to China.117
Chinese engagement with Latin America directly or indirectly
requires reliance on the banking sector. As part of a vertically
integrated strategy, presence in the banking sector is important for
the receipt of payment, the transfer of funds, the granting of credit,
and the conduct of commercial operations in general with a degree
of security and conﬁdentiality. Although only a modest step in
this direction, on September 1, 2004, the Santander Group, a major
multinational investment holding company in Latin America, signed
an accord with the Bank of China to provide an array of common
ﬁnancial products and bank services to its clients.118 The agreement
represents a signiﬁcant step in the ﬂedgling penetration of the region
by Chinese ﬁnancial entities, as a compliment to growing Chinese
investment in the region.
INCREASING CHINESE NONECONOMIC
ENGAGEMENT WITH LATIN AMERICA
China’s engagement with Latin America has not been limited to
trade and investment, although Chinese economic needs arguably
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have been key drivers of the expanded relationship. In addition to
trade and investment, China is stepping up its role in the region in a
number of other ways, from participation in regional peacekeeping
forces to expanded military ties.
An Expanded Voice and Presence in Regional Diplomacy.
In 2004, China sent a 125-man riot police detachment as part of
the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force in Haiti.119 Similarly,
because Haiti is one of a small number of nations concentrated in
Latin America which still grant diplomatic recognition to Taiwan,
many U.S. analysts view China’s presence in the peacekeeping force
as a part of its long-term strategy to convince these Latin American
nations to withdraw their recognition of Taiwan. In this regard, it
is signiﬁcant that recent state visits by Chinese Vice-President Zeng
Quinghong to Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, and
Jamaica each featured high-proﬁle declarations by the leaders of
those Latin American countries reiterating their support for a “OneChina” policy.120
Chinese participation in the UN peacekeeping force in Haiti may
also be interpreted as part of a more long-term strategy through which
China is pursuing a greater diplomatic presence in the region, and an
expanded voice in its politics. In March 2004, for example, China’s
National People’s Congress signed a cooperation agreement with the
multinational Latin American Parliament, and became an observer
of the body. Senior Chinese legislators subsequently traveled to the
Parliament’s home in Brasilia in January 2005 to meet with its president
and “deepen political, economic and cultural cooperation between
China and Latin American countries.”121 Similarly, during his visit
to Latin America in January-February 2005, Chinese Vice-President
Zeng Quinghong signed an agreement with the collective body of
foreign ministers from Andean Community Countries (Ancom)
promoting cooperation between China and Ancom, building on an
agreement signed in 2000 to establish a “Political Consultation and
Cooperation Mechanism” between the two sides.122 Although neither
Ancom nor the Latin American Parliament has signiﬁcant power as
a decisionmaking body, such initiatives reﬂect important steps along
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the path that China began in the 1990s, when it was granted observer
status in the Organization of American States (OAS), affording it a
window on some of the critical diplomatic processes ongoing in the
region, as well as an entrée into select OAS multinational activities.
The Chinese also may be working to strengthen ties between
the Communist Party and various radical, populist, or left-ofcenter movements in Latin America. In Venezuela, for example, the
Communist Party of China (CPC) announced on December 20, 2004,
that it was working to develop good party-to-party relations with
the ofﬁcial Movement of the 5th Republic (MVR) party of Venezuela.
The announcement was made during a meeting between delegates
of the two parties in conjunction with the visit of President Chávez
to Beijing.123 It is not yet clear whether the Chinese intend to use a
similar approach in dealing with other socialist governments in the
region, or radical parties such as the Movement Toward Socialism
(MAS) in Bolivia, but given the current movement of Latin America
toward the political left, such a strategy could signiﬁcantly increase
Chinese inﬂuence and involvement in the politics of the region.
An Expanded Chinese Military Role in Latin America.
In addition to expanded diplomatic presence in the region and
expanded party-to-party relations, the Chinese also appear to be
cautiously expanding their military presence and military ties. In
the arena of direct military presence, for example, Cuba may have
permitted Chinese operations at the former Soviet listening post
at Lourdes, allowing China to collect signals intelligence on U.S.
military satellite signals and other U.S. telecommunications. 124
With respect to military-to-military ties, China has cautiously
strengthened its relationships with a number of countries in
recent years, including Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Chile. In
Venezuela, the joint intention to strengthen military to military ties
was one of the elements of cooperation announced by the two nations
following the 2004 trip by President Chávez to China. Strengthened
Sino-Venezuelan military ties build on a modest foundation,
including China’s previous sale of military transport aircraft and
associated training to Venezuela.125 With respect to Ecuador, the two
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nations indicated a desire to strengthen their military ties during a
visit of the Ecuadorian Joint Chief of Staff Victor Rosero with the
Chinese People’s Liberation Army Chief of the General Staff Liang
Guanglie.126 With respect to Bolivia, Bolivian Defense Minister
Gonzalo Arredondo visited China in November 2004 to meet
with Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan. In the meeting,
the ministers acknowledged an increase in bilateral army-to-army
exchanges and visits and other forms of cooperation.127 With respect
to Chile, the two nations have a number of military-to-military ties,
although balanced by similar ties to the United States, South Korea,
Australia, and Japan. Sino-Chilean military-to-military ties include
attendance by Chilean ofﬁcers at the National Defense University
of China (since 1997), Chinese representation at the Chilean War
College (since 1997), visits by the Chinese naval commander to Chile
in 2002 and by the Chilean naval commander to China in 2003, and
multiple trips by the Chilean training ship, Esmeralda, to Chinese
ports.128
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION
AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
It is not necessary to postulate Chinese troops and bases in Latin
America in order to conclude that an expanded Chinese presence in
the region has enormous consequences for U.S. national security, and
as such, warrants serious examination. During the past century, the
U.S. military was deeply engaged in the politics of Asia, consistent
with the view that such global engagement made our own hemisphere
more secure. In the present century, by contrast, the United States
repeatedly will be forced to choose how much Chinese engagement
in our own hemisphere we can afford to ignore on the grounds that
it does not constitute an “immediate threat.”
In general, the Chinese presence in Latin America reﬂects
signiﬁcant erosion in the relative power and geopolitical position of
the United States, and the advent of a new century in which the United
States is preoccupied about Chinese adventurism in the Americas,
balancing out traditional Chinese concerns about the U.S. presence
in Asia. The dynamics and potential consequences of these trends
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range from economic damage to the United States to the potential
for signiﬁcant crises which, if mismanaged, could bring about direct
conﬂict between the United States and China in this hemisphere.
Some of the most immediate consequences of the current Chinese
engagement in Latin America involve the economic security of the
United States and the livelihood of U.S. citizens. To the extent that
Latin American countries sign free trade agreements both with
China and with the United States, American markets will become
increasingly open to duty free Chinese products―something that
China has never been able to obtain through direct negotiations with
the United States.129 The free trade accord that Chile has negotiated
with the United States, for example, in combination with the one that
Chile is currently negotiating with China, raises the possibility that
Chile (or other Latin American nations pursuing similar agreements)
could be used as a “pass through,” country, by which Chinese goods
were sold without tariffs to U.S. markets. Although the U.S.-led
initiative for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) is currently
experiencing difﬁculties, its achievement would compound U.S.
vulnerability to this Chinese competition.
Chinese Interests in Regional Stability.
China’s interest in securing access to the resources of Latin
America through trade and investment give it a vested interest in the
stability of the region. On its face, such interest is counterintuitive;
given China’s traditional alignment with anti-status quo thirdworld movements, constructing a secure supply chain requires
governments that are stable enough to extract, process, transport,
and export those goods that China requires to fuel its economic
expansion. The vested Chinese interest in stable, export-oriented
Latin American governments has the potential to create a number of
policy contradictions or dilemmas. For example, China has a vested
interest in leveraging and deepening its relationship with the populist
Chávez regime in Venezuela both because of Chávez’s ideological
sympathy with China, and because of Venezuelan petroleum
products and other resources. But China also has an interest in access
to the resources of Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador. Thus attempts by the
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Chávez regime to spread its Bolivarian revolution to these countries
by promoting radical indigenous movements ultimately could cause
China to begin to see Chávez as a net liability to its interests in the
region.
With the exception of pointedly anti-U.S. regimes such as
Venezuela and Cuba, Chinese interests in access to the region for
trade may ironically compliment U.S. interests and create short-term
opportunities for the United States and China to work together to
strengthen government structures and promote regional stability
and political institutionalization. This could, for example, include
strengthening of government institutions in Peru and Ecuador, both
of which possess oil resources and Paciﬁc ports.130 In both countries,
the political leadership is politically marginalized, including a strong
challenge from a powerful indigenous faction in Ecuador.131 Similarly,
China arguably has a vested interest in the emergence of a stable and
politically moderate Bolivia that could resolve its territorial disputes
with Chile and Peru, and increase exports of its natural gas resources
through Paciﬁc ports in one of those two countries.132
Chinese interest in promoting regional stability may ultimately
extend to Colombia as well. Although Colombia is closely tied to the
United States through the aid that it receives to ﬁght insurgent and
paramilitary groups and narcotics, it is willing to construct a pipeline
and a reﬁnery to facilitate the export of the region’s oil to the Paciﬁc
for potential sale to China. To the extent that the Guarija-Maracaibo
and Maracaibo-Puerto de Tribugal pipelines become reality, for
example, China could develop a vested interest in working with the
Colombians to prevent violence against them―just as the United
States provided security assistance to help the Colombians protect
the Caño-Limon-Covenas pipeline in Arauca state.
While China may actively support stability and market economies
in the countries of the region, such support does not imply that
China will abandon its traditional role as an ally of indigenous,
leftist, or anti-globalist movements in the region, including terrorists
or movements seeking to subvert regional governments. Such ties
will remain valuable to China as a means of channeling the efforts of
such groups away from actions that would harm Chinese investment
interests. At the same time, such ties could also be used to bring
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pressure on regional governments through selective action or the
threat thereof, as part of a larger strategy of negotiation between
China and those governments.
The Key Role of Latin American Countries with Paciﬁc Ports.
As foreshadowed in the previous section, the importance of
Paciﬁc ports for trade ﬂows with Latin America is likely to make
China particularly focused on its relationships with the countries
that have them. Because Paciﬁc ports are a key enabler for the timely
and economically viable ﬂow of goods between the two continents,
China is likely to be particularly interested in the politics, stability,
infrastructure, and business environment of those countries which
have such ports.
As a nation with both strategic minerals of interest and a number
of high-volume commercialized Paciﬁc ports, Chile, in particular, is
likely to emerge as a key player in China’s engagement with Latin
America. Total Chilean exports to China in 2003 were $1.85 billion,
representing more than a quarter of all Latin American exports to that
country.133 These exports included approximately $1 billion in annual
exports of the key strategic metal, copper. Chile’s dominance of South
America’s Paciﬁc coastline, in combination with its established trade
relationships with China and its multiple commercial deepwater
ports, make that nation the logical gateway to the sea for commerce
with much of the rest of Latin America. As the Chilean newspaper,
El Mercurio, put it, Chile is “a bridge to the huge world of the AsiaPaciﬁc.”134
With the meeting between Chilean President Richard Lagos and
Chinese President Hu Jintao at the APEC summit in November 2004,
the two countries ofﬁcially began negotiation of a free trade pact
which would position the nation even more clearly as the emerging
commercial hub for Latin American trade with China.135 Chile
arguably would welcome expanded trade ties with Asia insofar as
Asia would counterbalance the United States as an export market for
the Southern Core Common Market Customs Union (MERCOSUR),
thus increasing the independence of the South American trade block
and increasing Chile’s proﬁle as its dominant player and key trade
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conduit. Leading Chilean businessmen such as Sebastián Piñera of
LAN speak openly of China as a “third major partner, united through
the instrumentality of the APEC forum.”136 On the other hand, China
probably has fewer direct means to intervene in Chilean politics than
it has to shape other nations in Latin America. Chile is Latin America’s
strongest economy and most stable political system, and lacks a
signiﬁcant indigenous movement of leftist radicals that could be
used to foment instability. As manifested in the Chile-Bolivia border
dispute, however, Chile’s need to import energy is its Achilles’ heel,
and has been used by both Bolivia and Argentina to exert diplomatic
leverage. China’s future strategy in Chile consequently might be
shaped by helping Chile to attain access to foreign oil and natural
gas or reciprocally, by leveraging states such as a radicalized Bolivia
to pressure the nation.
In addition to Chile, China’s interest in nations with Paciﬁc ports
is likely to focus its attention on the politics of Ecuador, Peru, and
Colombia, although such a level of interest may not be apparent
at the present time. China thus may have particular interest in
Colombia’s success against sources of destabilization such as the
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia (FARC), the Ejército
Liberación Nacional (ELN), and sundry guerrilla and narcotrafﬁcking
groups. Similarly, China may have particular interest in channeling
the rise of indigenous groups in Ecuador and Peru to preclude them
from impairing that nation’s commerce.
Adverse Economic and Political Impacts
of Chinese Engagement for the Region.
As discussed previously, China has an interest in the economic
stability of the region; however, over the long term, the nature of its
engagement there is likely to affect the economic structure in such
a way that it will generate signiﬁcant economic displacement and
foment political unrest in the constituent states. Although important
differences exist between the economic structures of China and
Latin America, China fundamentally competes in the same market
for low-end manufactured goods as does Latin America.137 Chinese
labor is currently much cheaper than that in most of Latin America.
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One recent study by the U.S. International Trade Commission, for
example, found that the productivity of labor in Caribbean Basin
countries was only 50 percent of the productivity of Chinese labor.138
Another found that Chinese labor was, on average, one-quarter the
price of that of Latin America.139 In combination with its reduction of
shipping costs through the use of economies of scale and relatively
greater port efﬁciency,140 China is effectively able to underprice
factories operating in Latin America. Largely as a result of such
factors, more than 300 companies moved production from México to
China over the past year, contributing to that nation’s loss of more
than 200,000 employees in the Maquiladora sector.141
Aggravating the ability of Chinese manufacturing to underprice
its Latin American counterparts, a number of Latin American nations
are moving toward lowered trade barriers with China. In conjunction
with the APEC summit in November 2004, for example, Brazil,
Argentina, Chile, and Peru ofﬁcially recognized China’s status as a
“Market Economy,”142 hampering their ability to bring antidumping
charges against Chinese companies and otherwise protect local
markets against an inﬂux of Chinese goods. Similarly, in the textile
industry, quotas are slated to end January 1, 2005, and experts are
predicting an invasion of Chinese textiles into Latin America.143
If Latin America continues to lower protectionist barriers in the
face of China’s ability to underprice Latin America in manufacturing,
it is likely that Chinese competition will damage the Latin American
manufacturing sector badly, even while Latin American extractive
industries and foodstuffs experience a boom to support the Chinese
market. In such a scenario, trade with China may tend to shift the
economic structure of Latin America from manufacturing toward
extractive industries and basic foodstuffs.144 The loss of jobs due
to this economic shift is likely to be particularly acute insofar as
Chinese competition is greatest in those sectors which are most
labor intensive. The textile industry is an often-cited example where,
according to one source, with the liberalization of trade barriers,
China may capture up to 85 percent of global manufacturing, putting
at risk some 226,000 Latin American Maquiladora workers currently
in this sector.145
The adverse impact of competition with China on local economies
is likely to generate a political backlash from the industries and trade
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associations who stand the most to lose. Ecuador, for example, has
been considering the passage of new legislation which would make it
signiﬁcantly more difﬁcult for Chinese investors to enter the country
and compete against local businesses.146 In short, the economic
displacement that Chinese engagement with Latin America will
cause is likely to fuel a wave of protectionist or populist politics which
will threaten what will be, by then, signiﬁcant sunk investments and
established trade relationships.
The political response in Latin America may be exacerbated
further by the nature of Chinese investment. Unlike many Western
companies in the 20th century which made large direct investments in
Latin American factories and infrastructure projects, Latin American
experts fear that the promised Chinese investment is likely to come
in the form of low interest rate loans tied to the use of Chinese ﬁrms
to do the work. In the words of a former senior Argentine ofﬁcial,
“We would remain indebted for decades and decades to pay back
loans tied to direct awards to foreign corporations chosen by mere
government functionaries . . . when other businesses could have
done the same job on better terms.”147
Ironically, as China increasingly invests in and purchases
strategic materials from Latin America, while simultaneously using
the region as an export market for its manufactured goods, the
nation may create a neoimperialistic dynamic in the hemisphere,
albeit one with the consequences displaced onto the United States.
Argentina, for example, increasingly is looking to China to help
ﬁnance its foreign debt payments and secure independence from
the IMF, while simultaneously passing “antidumping laws” and
erecting protectionist barriers against Chinese merchandise.148 In
previous decades, dependence on Western capital was a key vehicle
in forcing Latin American nations to accept neoliberal economic
policies and free trade, limiting the degree to which they could
buy social peace with state institutions and government largesse.
As China’s position as a key investor and export market for Latin
America grows, the region similarly will become increasingly hard
pressed to sustain policies that discriminate against Chinese imports.
Through this self-reinforcing cycle, greater trade with China may
thus erode mechanisms of institutional resistance, accelerating

29

and deepening that trade relationship. To the degree that such a
deepening displaces Latin American manufacturing industries with
less labor intensive extractive industries, however, increasing trade
with China could reduce the number of jobs in the region and deepen
poverty. To the extent that extractive industries traditionally involve
major concessionary arrangements with governments and major
capital investments, by fueling the growth of such industry in Latin
America, socialist China ironically could deepen the corruption and
class disparities that traditionally have plagued the region. In short, it
is possible that heightened Chinese trade will produce a region with
more poverty, corruption, crime, political chaos, and indigenous
populism. Furthermore, the direct effect of these job losses, and the
indirect effects of the political chaos that it could spawn, will probably
be increased migration within countries, and from the South to the
United States and other destinations.
Expanded Presence of Chinese Nationals in the Region.
As trade ties expand in the region, the physical presence of
Chinese nationals is also likely to expand, particularly in areas which
compound other challenges that the United States faces in the region.
In conjunction with the APEC summit, China added Argentina and
Brazil to its list of approved tourist destinations.149 Mexico and Peru
subsequently were given “Approved Destination Status” (ADS) in
January 2005.150 This change is particularly signiﬁcant insofar as it
is estimated that 28.5 million trips abroad were made by Chinese
citizens in 2004,151 and it is estimated that within 15 years, some 100
million Chinese tourists will be traveling throughout the world.152
To the extent that China adds speciﬁc Latin American countries to
its list of approved travel destinations, the region could be impacted
signiﬁcantly by this private and business tourism.
In addition to tourism, the number of Chinese living and doing
business in Latin America also is expanding rapidly, albeit from a
low level. For example, 130,000 Chinese nationals currently live in
Venezuela.153 In the wake of increasing violence against Chinese
nationals in Venezuela in recent years, including election-related
violence against Chinese supermarkets in the state of Carobobo, China
has initiated a system of monitoring and protection for its citizens
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living in that country.154 Although the Chinese population in South
America is currently miniscule, the rate of increase is signiﬁcant.
Ecuador, for example, currently has only 5,004 Chinese nationals
registered in the country under permanent or semi-permanent visas,
yet the number entering the country jumped by more than a third
from the level of the prior year.155 The pattern and implications of
Chinese immigration are also a matter of concern. For example,
15,000 Chinese currently reside in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay,156 part
of the “Triple Frontier” region that has been an area of particular
concern for its potential ties to international terrorist networks.
With increased human contacts, it is likely that Chinese and Latin
American criminal and terrorist organizations will interact in ways
difﬁcult to anticipate, and often outside the knowledge or control of
the Chinese state.157 Such relationships might include strengthened
ties between Chinese triads, such as the Fu Chin, and Latin American
organized crime158―including trafﬁcking in both drugs and human
beings―producing new patterns of collaboration and competition.
Logical areas where networks may either cross-over or ﬁght include
the interaction between the Colombian kidnapping industry and
Asian personnel trafﬁcking, as well as the competing heroin industries
of the Andes and the Golden Triangle. It is also unclear whether
the infusion of Chinese capital will help to rationalize, or will only
exacerbate, the corruption, particularism, and lack of transparency
evident in some Latin American ﬁnancial systems.
As China becomes increasingly involved in the region, it is also
likely that such presence will create new perceived national interests
to be protected. It is not clear, for example, how China would react
to escalating kidnapping of its business and government personnel
in Colombia or to a failed state of the future such as Bolivia, where
it is trying to operate strategically important petroleum and mineral
extraction concessions. Reaction by the Chinese state to increasing
violence against its nationals in Venezuela during recent years, for
example, is a sign that the dynamics stemming from the heightened
proﬁle of the Chinese population and interests in Latin America are
already beginning. Similarly, it is not clear how China will react to
guerilla violence that cuts important oil ﬂows, or radical political
change resulting in the nationalization and seizure of assets owned
in part by the Chinese state or afﬁliated business interests.
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Over the coming years, it is also likely that speciﬁc events within
China and on the world stage will generate imperatives that may
cause China to change its approach toward the region, or rapidly
deepen its level of interest in difﬁcult to anticipate ways. China is,
for example, currently experiencing its worst drought since 1951.
The lack of water is anticipated to impact domestic food production
severely, reducing the nation’s harvest by 510,000 metric tons this
year alone.159 Furthermore, the lower water table has begun to
impair the generation of hydroelectric power.160 The consequence of
both these phenomena is likely to be a sharp rise in China’s imports
of foodstuffs and fossil fuels for power generation, beyond the
expansion predicted from economic growth alone, and with it,
potentially heightened interest in Latin American sources of
supply.
Ultimately, increasing Chinese involvement in the hemisphere is
likely to give rise to a number of strategic dilemmas for the United
States. Given the position of power that the United States currently
has in the region, such dilemmas as outlined above easily may be
circumvented as they develop, yet may be much graver if they
manifest themselves as a crisis. What is required is identiﬁcation in
advance of what some of the futures might be; what concrete steps
the United States can take to position itself in response to these
developments; and what the advantages, disadvantages, and risks
are of a particular course of action.
CONCLUSION
Chinese pursuit of its national interests in Latin America may
unfold in a number of ways, depending on assumptions concerning
key factors such as actual levels of Chinese economic growth and
industrialization during the coming decades. The particular course
taken by Latin America’s current array of indigenous movements,
socialist governments, and radical populist leaders, as well as the
way in which they interact, may create particular crises in particular
countries at particular times. Although certain scenarios are more
likely or more grave than others, decisionmakers responsible for
managing U.S. policy in Latin America need to map out the principal

32

scenarios and begin thinking through the merits and consequences
of alternative responses, so as to avoid falling victim to strategic
surprise when such events occur.
In whatever manner the topic is studied, the long-term trends
driving an increased Chinese presence in Latin America are not
likely to abate. The U.S. position in Latin America is currently strong,
and the Chinese trade and investment presence is relatively limited.
Yet, an examination of China’s strategic aims in the region and the
potential for increased Chinese inﬂuence in the Western Hemisphere
remains an important task.
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